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Introduction
Although balance of payments crises come and go, and although the details of any one specific crisis are likely to differ from those of another, there is an underlying continuity between them. They are handled by a combination of adjustment policy and external financing. The nature of the adjustment policy and the size and source of external financing varies but the basic policy alternatives facing governments encountering crises are essentially similar. Adjustment may, in principle, take on a demand-side or supply-side orientation but is likely to incorporate some measure of domestic demand contraction, since aggregate domestic demand is quicker and easier to manipulate than aggregate supply. Policy tools will include monetary policy, fiscal policy and exchange rate policy. However, "structural" adjustment and exchange rate policy may also be part of the strategy and policy may include microeconomic measures designed to strengthen the supply side. If the choice were to be unconstrained, it may be assumed that governments would rationally opt for a combination of adjustment speed and external financing that minimized the perceived cost of overcoming the crisis (in terms of lost output and therefore employment). But their choice will not be unconstrained. Economic and political constraints may limit the speed and severity of adjustment. However, the binding constraint is often likely to be the availability of financing. Countries hold only finite levels of international reserves and even relatively large reserve holdings may be quickly wiped out during a crisis. Private capital markets will not always deem countries creditworthy, particularly in crisis conditions, and there are constraints on how much the IMF can lend.
Moreover, in the case of the IMF, loans are conditional, so that borrowing from the IMF does not allow a country to by-pass adjustment altogether. Indeed the country loses a degree of sovereignty over the choice of adjustment policy in return for the additional resources that the IMF supplies. With or without the Fund, impaired access to international liquidity may force countries to pursue balance of payments strategies that are heavily adjustment-intensive. Given the primacy of strengthening the balance of payments over other policy objectives during a crisis, adjustment will involve contractionary monetary and fiscal policy aimed at reducing aggregate demand and exchange rate devaluation aimed at boosting international export competitiveness.
Any international financial system implicitly or explicitly deals with the question of the appropriate blend between financing and adjustment in the event of balance of payment deficits. The IMF was set up in part to provide member countries with an additional source of financing to enable them to avoid adjustment policies that would be potentially "destructive of national prosperity". However, a number of things have happened since the IMF was established. In particular, private international capital markets have grown hugely and, with the declining use of controls over its movement, capital has become highly mobile.
Given the key role of expectations in influencing the international movement of capital and the short run instability of expectations, capital flows have become highly volatile. IMF financing was originally intended and designed to help deal with traderelated current account deficits rather than crises of the capital account 1 . It has been in this context that there have been calls for a new international financial architecture. 1 As noted recently by Fischer (2001) , (t)he huge expansion of international capital flows of the last decade has delivered significant economic benefits to borrowers and lenders alike. But as we have seen all too often in recent years, this silver lining has a cloud. Countries have been exposed to periodic crises of confidence when large inflows of capital suddenly go into reverse. As capital flows have increased relative to the size of This paper examines these issues in the context of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 and subsequent developments both in the region and globally. Focusing on East Asia is appropriate since it was the crisis that breathed life into the architecture debate; although it had been the Mexican crisis of 1994 that had issued the first alert.
However, the underlying analysis provided here is more general and can be applied to other regions of the world where financial crises have occurred or may yet occur.
Without investigating the causes of the East Asian crisis in detail (for instance, see Berg, 1999) , Section 2 emphasizes one dimension of it, viz. the shortage of international liquidity. Declining liquidity frequently lies at the heart of the dynamics of currency crises.
Section 3 goes on to examine the implications of illiquidity for adjustment in the case of East Asia. It does not seek to evaluate the details of IMF-sponsored programs in the region but merely the consequences of the trade-off between external financing and the speed and intensity of adjustment . Given the size of the output losses experienced, Section 3 proceeds to examine potential ways of enhancing the availability of liquidity in crisis conditions so that such losses may be minimized in the event of potential future crises. There are reasons to doubt whether liquidity enhancement will be adequately provided by private capital markets and there may therefore be a role for governments or inter-governmental agencies to play. But does this imply an expanded role for the IMF?
An alternative approach could be regional in focus rather than multilateral. Section 4 examines and assesses the regional initiatives that are currently under way in Asia.
Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks that place these developments in the context of a new international financial architecture.
national economies, so too has the disruption that such reversals can cause. The spread of financial crisis is far from random: contagion tends to hit weaker economies more quickly and more forcefully than strong ones. But even so, it is hard to believe that the speed and severity with which crises spread can be justified entirely by economic fundamentals (p.2). To the extent that the recessionary effects of devaluation were underestimated at the time, contractionary aggregate demand management policies would have resulted in recession over-kill. Judged against potential output (real GDP) for each economy, the IMF has estimated that the cumulative output losses from the 1997/98 crisis were much larger than those following the Tequila crisis in Latin America in 1994 (see Table 2 ). The question then becomes whether these output losses could have been reduced. This brings us back to the trade-off between the severity of adjustment in the short run and the availability of international liquidity.
The East Asian Financial Crisis: Illiquidity and Its Implications
Liquidity, CrisIs and the IMF
As already noted, illiquidity, lack of confidence, and self-fulfilling expectations create a highly combustible cocktail. But, by the same token, where liquidity is perceived to be adequate, confidence can be maintained and the self-fulfillment of expectations may mean that liquidity is adequate. It has long been recognized that inadequate liquidity can threaten the stability of international financial regimes. Thus, during the 1960s, the prime concern relating to the Bretton Woods international financial system was the widely perceived shortage of international liquidity. A sequence of reforms designed to increase international liquidity culminating in the introduction of the IMF's own international reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right, were aimed at shoring up the Bretton Woods system by reducing its vulnerability to crisis. Prior to the establishment of the SDR the IMF attempted to provide quick-disbursing low conditionality finance through lower credit tranche drawings and through its
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) which was designed to help countries deal with problems caused by exogenous shortfalls in export earnings. While the CFF was designed with developing countries in mind, the industrial countries developed a system of bilateral swap arrangements within which countries encountering a speculative crisis threatening the durability of their exchange rate peg could swap domestic currency for foreign currency with other central banks -a transaction that was reversed after the speculative attack had been repelled and the crisis had passed. Indeed, ultimately industrial countries no longer needed to turn to the IMF for assistance because they managed to develop sources of liquidity that they deemed preferable. From a government's perception an advantage associated with international reserves is that they may be used quickly and without conditions. This may also appear to be the case with financing from private capital markets. But while private capital inflows may again logically be used to finance temporary current account balance of payments deficits, the logic breaks down when the crisis is connected to the capital account. In this case, it is capital outflows that are the problem. Countries will be losing creditworthiness and their consequent access to private capital markets. Liquidity-based policies will instead need to be directed towards arresting the outflow of capital. In the midst of the crisis there is no guarantee that conventional wisdom relating to the capital account will apply. Thus raising the rate of interest may transmit a negative signal about the state of the economy and its future prospects and may lead to further capital outflows 4
. A fall in the value of the currency may enhance expectations of a further fall with a similar outcome.
Provision of external financing may, for these reasons, be seen by some as a "public good" and as being appropriately supplied by the IMF. As noted earlier, the IMF used to possess a quick-disbursing low conditionality lending window (the CFF) designed to provide liquidity in the event of trade-related current account deficits.
However, the trend since the 1980s has been towards greater conditionality and this, almost by definition reduces the speed with which liquidity may be disbursed. By the time a Fund program has been negotiated the internal dynamics of a crisis may be well established and therefore more difficult to break. Combined with the sheer size of capital movements as opposed to budget and trade deficits, the IMF may therefore be struggling to provide significant financial support, even though the absolute amount of lending to countries encountering capital account crises may put strains on the Fund's own resources.
The problem facing the Fund, which has constituted one component of the debate about a new international financial architecture, has been how to provide adequate liquidity to help forestall and, if needed, help deal with crises where there is reluctance to make concessions in terms of conditionality and reluctance to substantially increase the Fund's lending capacity. The Fund's response has been to create the Contingent Credit Line (CCL). The idea here was to establish a precautionary line of credit for countries that might be affected by contagion from a crisis, and to finance this 4 There is a burgeoning literature on the interest rate impact on exchange rates and capital flows during a crisis period. For instance, see Furman and Stiglitz (1998) .
from outside the Fund's quota-based resources by new arrangements to borrow (NAB).
The negotiation of conditionality with potential users of the CCL would therefore take place before the country needed to draw on the Fund. However, no country has negotiated a CCL and the facility has had to be re-evaluated. Its weaknesses have been widely recognized and acknowledged (Fischer, 2001 ).
Why should countries sacrifice sovereignty over national policy and subject themselves to strict conditionality when all they receive in return is an option on a drawing? Since, in many cases, countries fail to implement conditionality for one reason or another, a situation could arise where a country complies with a significant proportion of conditionality and yet is ineligible to draw in the event of experiencing contagion from a crisis. Of most concern, however, has been the possibility that by negotiating a CCL a country sends out a negative signal to private capital markets that it is vulnerable to a (1998) concluded that a currency crisis in a regional economy raises the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency by about 8.5 percent points. All of this provides rationale for developing regionally based contingent credit facilities to buttress reserve holdings of individual countries so as to prevent sudden credit contraction due to a liquidity crisis.
swaps used to support pegged exchange rates during the Bretton Woods era. There are signs that this is the direction in which Asian economies are moving. The next section examines developments and the unresolved issues to which these developments give rise.
Regional Liquidity Arrangements
To some extent economies in Asia have strengthened their international liquidity positions by replenishing and accumulating reserves (see Table 1 again), as well as by lengthening the average maturity of their external indebtedness (Table 3) . While the maximum amount of withdrawal under each of the BSAs will be determined by negotiations between the two countries concerned, in the spirit of regional partnership there is planned to be full coordination and consultation among all members when deciding on disbursements.
While the basic idea behind the CMI is clear, the details still need to be clarified.
Journalistic accounts suggest that 10 percent of the funds will be available automatically while the rest will be subject to IMF conditionality. Other details of the new swap arrangements, such as the type of collateral that may be required for hard currency loans, the interest rate to be charged, and the number of withdrawals that can be made
are not yet known. However economic analysis helps to identify some broad principles that need to be incorporated in the initiative. First, the resources need to be capable of being disbursed quickly. Speed is of the essence in a crisis. Second, the credit lines need to be sufficiently large as to generate confidence in private capital markets and to repel speculative attacks, as well as involving sufficient countries to avoid potential problems of co-variance and to allow the pooling of risks. Third, the rate of interest needs to be sufficiently high as to guard against moral hazard. Countries need to be discouraged from using such credit lines as a matter of course. Fourth, access to such liquidity needs to be separated from the detailed negotiation of conditionality which would prejudice quick dispersal; links to IMF conditionality are therefore a cause of concern. However, given the part played in the East Asian crisis by weak domestic financial structures, inadequate prudential standards and supervision, there is a strong argument for making access to the credit lines associated with the CMI conditional upon compliance with some minimum set of financial standards. This would encourage countries to push ahead with reforms to their domestic financial systems.
A credible system of regional swaps based on these principles would have two key attractions. Not only would it enable participants to avoid the severe output losses that are associated with extreme shortages of liquidity but also, by creating confidence that such extreme shortages will not occur, the incidence of crises could be reduced. Of course, confidence would be undermined if the swap arrangements were used to try and defend disequilibrium real exchange rates and the CMI should not therefore be a mechanism for inappropriate currency pegging in the region. Again the history of bilateral swaps in the context of the Bretton Woods system demonstrates that they are an ineffective means of defending seriously misaligned currencies.
Concluding Remarks: Regionalism versus Multilateralism
The IMF's new Managing Director, Horst Kohler, has expressed support for regional initiatives such as the CMI as long as they do not compete with the IMF (see Kohler, 2001 ). There are reasons to believe that regional arrangements have a comparative advantage over multilateral ones when it comes to the provision of contingent credit lines. First, an important part of their purpose is to deal with contagion from crises and this tends to be regional in nature. Second, regional credit lines would have more of the features of a credit union than the IMF possesses. All participants in them would be able to perceive circumstances in which they might themselves needing to use the credit lines and this vested interest would create a stronger motivation to make the system successful than perhaps exists in the case of the IMF's CCL. Third, prudential and supervisory standards might be more appropriately set at the regional level where special circumstances could be more easily identified and addressed.
Finally, regional swap arrangements could reduce financial pressures on the IMF during a crisis and might be a better way of providing liquidity with "light" conditionality. Political economy considerations suggest that these issues could be more easily addressed by reforms such as the CMI than by seeking to reform the IMF. Regional swap arrangements would not, however, preclude reforms to IMF conditionality and the ways in which the Fund raises its own resources.
For the above reasons, regional arrangements for providing liquidity would be consistent with the central elements of the new international financial architecture. It is still possible to think globally and to act regionally. The IMF would continue to stand ready to assist economies where regional arrangements failed to resolve problems, but, in this event, it might be more reasonable to assume that these problems were not exclusively to do with shortages of liquidity, and this would raise the credibility of IMF conditionality. For poorer developing countries, where balance of payments deficits remain driven by the current account, conventional IMF lending or even a resuscitated low conditionality compensatory lending facility could augment the regional credit lines organized by emerging economies. Notes: a) "Calculated as the sum of the output gap over a four year period, starting with the crisis year. The output gap is defined as the percentage difference between the actual and the hypothetical (or 'potential') level of real GDP for each country. Graphically, the cumulative output loss would thus be represented by the area between the 'potential' and actual output paths, starting from the crisis year and expressed as a percentage of "potential" real GDP. It follows that accumulated losses will be positive, and possibly large, even in cases where output is back to 'potential' at the end of the four-year period. In the counterfactual scenario, it is assumed that 'potential' GDP grows at 4 percent per annum and that actual and 'potential' output coincided within the two-year period preceding the crisis. 'Actual' GDP during 1999-2002 refers to IMF projections" Source: (IMF (1999) 
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